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CHRISTOPHER  TUGENDHAT  SPEAKS  ON  EUROPEAN  ELECTIONS 
The  following are extracts  from  a  speech given by 
Christopher Tugendhat,  EEC  Commissioner responsible for the 
budget,  at the European Briefing Conference of the Conservative 
and Unionist  Central Office,  at 11.45 am  on  Saturday,  July 1, 
at Burford Bridge Hotel,  Dorking, 
"Introduction of Direct Elections to the European Parliament,  now  scheduled to be 
held for the first time in June next year,  should make  it possible significantly 
to extend the influence of the peoples of the member  states in the Community's 
decision making,  and if such an extension does  indeed take place,  the Community 
will,  I  believe, be able to enter a  new  much  more  dynamic  phase of development 
based upon  the foundation of much  more  complete public trust than at present in 
all its institutions  and policies, 
Avoiding National Analogies 
"The  410  members  of the new  Parliament will include people from many  different 
national backgrounds  and constitutional traditions, very  few  of whom  will have 
experience of the Community's  institutions,  In these circumstances it will be 
very difficult for Euro MPs  to identify and apply the approach most likely to 
yield the best results. 
One  inevitable and immensely  dangerous  temptation for the newly  elected MPs  will 
be  to set their sights  upon  acquiring powers  in relation to the Community's  other 
institutions analogous  to the powers  enjoyed by national parliaments  in relation 
to national governments.  Such  a  course would be entirely inappropriate and,  almost 
certainly,  extremely  damaging to the Parliament's prospects of increasing its 
influence, 
It would be inappropriate because all the institutions of the Community,  including 
the Parliament,  are  quite different, both in form and function,  from those of the 
Community's  national governments,  And  it would be  damaging to the Parliament's 
prospects because it would be bound to lead to a  major constitutional collision 
with the Council of Ministers  in which the Parliament would be bound to sustain 
by  far the severest injuries, 
The  American  Congress 
"There  can be no  doubt  whatever that the knowledge  that they will have to explain 
and defend their actions before Congressional committees has a  very substantial 
and salutary effect upon  the actions of American  governments.  And  I  am  convinced 
that if the European Parliament  follows  Congress'  example  and concentrates its 
energies  primarily upon  ensuring that the Council of Ministers  and the European 
Commission  have to provide the fullest possible justification for their behaviour 
before both its specialist committees  and its meetings  in plenary session,  then it 
will be  able to wield much  greater influence than its limited legal powers  might 
suggest is likely. 
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"Another feature of the present Parliament which  somewhat  blunts its 
effectiveness is its habit of holding most  of its committee meetings  in 
private.  I  believe that the directly elected Parliament  should expose its 
committee  sessions much  more  often than its predecessor to the public  gaze; 
for,  in the nature of things,  the wider the audience  the more  anxious will 
be those who  have to appear before the committees  adequately to  account  for 
their actions. 
The  need for Parliament to speak with a  coherent voice 
"The  efficacy of the approach  I  am  recommending will be  severely impaired, 
however,  if directly elected MPs  fail to recognise another essential pre-
condition of the successful exercise of influence by a  body  armed with only 
limited legal sanctions  - namely,  the possession of a  coherent collective 
voice.  The  need to justify themselves  before Parliament is not likely to 
weigh heavily  ~pon Ministers  or Commissioners,  nor to modify their policies, 
if the Parliament is known  to bedriven by  a  welter of conflicting factional 
or national viewpoints  - not least beoeuse  in that event Parliament is 
likely to enjoy very little respect with the European public which it is 
supposed to represent. 
"A  change  which would greatly facilitate,  though it would not guarantee,  the 
emergence  of such  a  majority would be  a  reduction in the number  of political 
groups  at present sitting separately from  each other in the European 
Parliament  and the emergence  of a  better organised party system. 
This  is  something which  should especially concern Conservatives.  For while 
the socialist parties of different nationalities  in the European Parliament, 
including the British Labour Party,  have  succeeded in merging  themselves  into 
a  single,  if sometimes  rather undisciplined, political entity, the parties of 
the centre right are still split between three separate groups:  the European 
People's Party,  comprising the Community's  main Christian Democratic Parties; 
the European Progressive Democrats,  comprising the Gaullists  and Ireland's 
Fianna Fail Party;  and the European  Conservative Party,  an alliance of 
British and Danish  Conservatives. 
This  lack of unity has  unquestionably substantially weakened the capacity of 
the centre right parties.  I  therefore very much  welcome  the recent  creation 
of the European Democratic  Union,  an organisation bringing together a  number 
of centre right parties inside the Community  - including the German  Christian 
Democrats,  the Gaullists  and the British Conservatives -with a  number  of 
smaller parties outside - including the Swedish  and Norwegian  Conservatives 
and the Austrian Peoples'  Party,  The  EDU  provides  the framework within which 
we  can,  and must,  establish the much  closer links  upon  which the defence of 
our  common  values  depends. 
Relations  between Parliament  and the Commission 
"The  institutions of the  Community  have  evolved  J.n  a  manner  very different 
from  that wnch  the founding  fathers  envisaged,  Most  notably,  the Council of 
Ministers  has  acquired an unexpected and decisive superiority over the other 
institutions which,  for better or worse,  it seems  unlikely to lose in the 
foreseeable  future, 
Naturally and inevitably ministers  in Council tend to think primarily in terms 
of their respective national responsibilities,  The  Commission's  role on the 
other hand is to expound  and  defend the Community  interest.  If experience of 
the existing European Parliament is a  guide it seems  likely that its directly 
elected successor will also think mainly  in supra-national terms. 
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Assuming that this  is  so,  both the Parliament and the  Commission will have 
a  substantial interest in forming  a  close  and constructive working relation-
ship with each  other in order to maximise  the pressure that they  can bring 
to bear upon  the  Council.  But if they  are to succeed in working together 
as  partners it will be necessary for  each to act appropriately towards  the 
other. 
On  their side, the directly elected MPs  will obviously have  to take great 
care to avoid seeking confrontation with the Commission merely  for its own 
sake. 
Meanwhile,  for its part, the  Commission will have to make  every effort to 
demonstrate that it holds  the Parliament  in high respect.  The  Commission 
takes the existing Parliament very seriously and relations between the two 
bodies  are,generally  speaking,  very satisfactory.  But it would be  a  mistake 
for the Commission to assume  that it can take the good will of the  directly 
elected Parliament  for granted. 
I  would like to draw  your attention to objections to changing the basis  upon 
which  the Commission  is selected.  The  founding fathers  envisaged that the 
Commission  would be  a  political body.  To  help give it political credibility, 
the Treaty  endowed  the  Commission,  which takes  its decisions  by  majority vote, 
with a  composition designed broadly  speaking to reflect the political weight 
of the member  states,  It is  not  unreasonable to  suppose  that  some  at least 
outside the Camnission who  wish to change the basis  on  which it is  chosen hope 
touse the pretext of concern for the Commission's  efficiency covertly to 
reduce  its political authority.  Yet it seems  to me  that the need for a 
political Commission  is  just as  great in 1978  as  it was  in 1957.  And  even 
if others  disagree,  it would surely be wrong to make  a  major  change of this 
kind ostensibly on  narrowly  administrative  grounds  without full and open 
consideration of the wider implications. 
Bolder proposals 
Returning to the  issue of the relations between the Commission  and the 
Parliament,  the Commission will of course have  to do  more,  if it is to enter 
a  constructive partnership with the Parliament,  than  devote  adequate time to 
parliamentary matters.  It will also have to ensure that wherever possible its 
own  proposals are  in harmony  with Parliament's  views. 
At  present the Commission  concentrates mainly  though by  no  means  exclusively 
upon  attempting to  influence  governments  by means  of private discussions with 
national ministers  and their officials behind closed doors.  This  is  a  vital 
task which must  not be  abandoned,  But if the Commission is to have  any  hope 
of winning the assent for the more  adventurous  proposals  which are likely to 
be  the consequence of direct elections, if it is to persuade national 
ministers to discard the blinkers which they too often wear when  they  survey 
the Community  scene,  then Commissioners  will also have  to be much  more  pre-
pared than at present to step outside the corridors  of power  and robustly to 
enter the  arena of public  debate. 
In the final analysis  the conduct of the Community's  national governments  is 
largely  determined by their perception of the attitudes  and expectations of 
the  na~nal electorates to which they are responsible.  What  the  Commission 
must  try to do,  therefore,  is to  explain tb those electorates directly,  by 
all the  appropriate methods  available to them,  the substantial concrete 
benefits  which  Community  action can bring them,  They must try to persuade 
nat i o::al  electorates  themselves  to bring pressure on  national governments to 
make  proper use of the opportunities  which the Community  offers them. 
This  of course is  a  political task requiring political skills.  But then,  as 
I  said earlier, the  Commission is, and should remain,  a  pol;i.tical body." 